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The Dischargeability of Debts in Bankruptcy
Paul I. Hartman*
To many debtors, the discharge is the raison d'etre of the bankruptcy
laws. In this article, Professor Hartman discusses the history of the dis-
charge, its availability and application in certain situations, and its per-
sonal nature.
I. INThODUCrION
From the viewpoint of the bankrupt debtor, a discharge from his obliga-
tions is, no doubt, the most important facet of bankruptcy proceedings.
The bankruptcy discharge is designed to relieve the honest debtor from his
financial entanglements, and to give him an opportunity to reinstate him-
self in the business world.' A debtor is now entitled to a discharge as a
matter of right, unless he has been guilty of certain specified offenses
against the Bankruptcy Act.2 For many generations the idea of a discharge
from one's debts has been the relieving feature of bankruptcy. However,
it has not always been so. The first English bankruptcy acts-in which
American bankruptcy law finds its origin-did not contain even the germ
of an idea of a discharge. 3 On the contrary, each English bankruptcy law
contained express provision that the bankrupts remaining debts should
not be construed to be released notwithstanding the fact that all his assets
were divided up ratably among his creditors; in addition, the bankruptcy
law under Elizabeth expressly provided that, if the bankrupt should after-
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. Member, Tennessee Bar.
1. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); Williams v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915); In re Rinker, 107 F. Supp. 261 (D.N.M.
1952).
2. Section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act specifies seven grounds for objecting to the
discharge. In brief, they are as follows: (1) Nine different criminal offenses that are
"kmowingly" and "fraudulently" committed, as provided under 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1958).
These include such offenses as (a) conversion of the bankrupts property, (b) taking
a false oath in the bankruptcy proceedings, and (c) filing a false claim in the 'bank-
ruptcy proceedings, etc. To deprive the bankrupt of a discharge, it is not necessary that
he be convicted of one of the enumerated offenses. It is enough if it be shown by
clear and convincing evidence that he has been guilty of any such offense. In re
Shear, 201 Fed. 460 (W.D.N.Y. 1913). (2) Interference with or failure to keep
financial records, unless the failure is justified. (3) Obtaining money or credit by false
statements in writing. (4) Fraudulent conveyances or concealments within twelve
months preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition. (5) Prior discharge within six
years. (6) Refusal to obey any lawful order of, or to answer any material question
approved by, the court. (7) Failure to explain losses or deficiency of assets to meet
his liabilities. Bankruptcy Act § 14c, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 32 (1958).
3. GLENN, LIQUIDATiON § 180 (1935).
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wards acquire any new property, the right to it should immediately vest
in all his creditors, both old and new, and that it should be administered
by the bankruptcy commissioners as part of the bankrupt's estate, no matter
how long a period of time might have elapsed.4 The entrance of the idea
of a discharge into the bankruptcy system first came about through the
consent of the creditors, who allowed the debtor the privilege of a dis-
charge upon his presentation to the court of a certificate signed by the
requisite percentage of claims.5 It was not until the reign of Queen Anne
that an act was passed in 1705, granting the privilege of a discharge to
a debtor from his remaining debts, provided he had surrendered all his
assets and made full disclosure to his creditors. 6
Although the first actual bankruptcy law of the United States was passed
in 1800, during the administration of John Adams, we are told that it was
not until our second bankruptcy act, passed in 1841, that a discharge and
release of the debtor from his remaining debts made its appearance in our
bankruptcy jurisprudence.7
Even though the bankrupt receives a discharge, it is not an effective de-
fense to all of his obligations. Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act provides
that the discharge shall release a bankrupt "from all of his provable debts,
whether allowable in full or in part," except those debts listed later in
section 17 of the act as not being affected by the discharge.8 At the outset,
therefore, it can be seen that an obligation of a bankrupt is not discharged
unless it is provable against the bankrupts estate at the time it is offered
up for liquidation. Claims that are not provable are not impaired by the
bankrupts discharge; they ride through bankruptcy. This is as it should
be, because a claim that is not provable never had a chance at the bank-
rupt's estate, and it should not be dischargeable.
However, it should be made clear that not all debts that are provable
are dischargeable. There are certain kinds of debts that are not discharge-
able in bankruptcy even though they may be provable and share in the
distribution of the bankrupts estate. Such debts will be examined below
in considerable detail. Moreover, the scheduling of a non-provable debt in
the bankruptcy proceedings does not operate to make the debt discharge-
able.9 For the purpose of the discharge, provable debts include not only
those which have actually been proved against the estate, but also those
capable of being proved.10 Thus, a contingent claim that might have been
4. 1 RmIuNGToN, BANKRUPTCY § 4 (5th ed. 1950).
5. GLENN, LIQUIDATION § 358 (1935).
6. 1 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 4 (5th ed. 1950).
7. 1 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 8 (5th ed. 1950).
8. Bankruptcy Act § 17a, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35
(1958). See also Bankruptcy Act § 1(15), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended,
11 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
9. In re Cushman, 3 F.2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
10. 1 CoLLiER, BANKRUPTCY II 17.04 (14th ed. 1956).
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proved, liquidated or estimated, and allowed, is dischargeable."
In order to approach the subject of what debts are dischargeable, it is
necessary to inquire at the outset what claims are provable against the
estate of the bankrupt. Only those debts listed in section 63 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act are provable.
II. PRovABiLrrY OF CLanMs
A. Claims That Are Provable
Section 63a of the Bankruptcy Act lists nine types of claims which are
provable against the bankrupts estate.12
1. Fixed Liabilities, Absolutely Owing
The first type of claim that is made provable under section 63a of the
act is a debt that is founded upon "(1) a fixed liability, as evidenced by a
judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the
filing of the petition by or against him [bankrupt], whether then payable
or not . ."13 A "judgment" within the purview of this type of provable
claim is "absolutely owing" when rendered and entered, irrespective of a
pending appeal, at least where no supersedeas bond has been filed.
14 Since
a verdict is not the equivalent of a judgment, a verdict is not entitled to
proof as a judgment.15 Likewise, certain types of judicial action, evidencing
financial obligations of the debtor, do not fall within this clause of prov-
ability. Thus, neither a fine for violation of law,
16 nor a forfeiture,17 nor
an order and judgment for support of an illegitimate child,
18 nor alimony
11. 1 CoLLIR, BANKRUPTCY f17.04 (Supp. 1960). The provability of contingent
claims will be dealt with later. See text accompanying notes 58-64 infra.
12. Bankruptcy Act § 63a, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1958).
13. "Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which are
founded upon (1) a fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in
writing, absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition by or against him,
whether then payable or not, with any interest thereon which would have been recover-
able at that date or with a rebate of interest upon such as were not then payable
and did not bear interest .... Bankruptcy Act § 63a, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898),
as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1958).
14. Moore v. Douglas, 230 Fed. 399 (9th Cir. 1916). See 3 CozLIER, BANKRUPTCY
1 63.10 (14th ed. 1956).
15. In re Eads, 17 F.2d 813 (W.D. Wash. 1926). See 3 CorLuma, BANKRUPTCY
11 63.10 (14th ed. 1956) for a more extensive treatment of provability where the lia-
bility is evidenced by a judgment.
16. In re Moore, 111 Fed. 145 (W.D. Ky. 1901) (fine imposed in criminal prosecu-
tion). A fine imposed for contempt of court is not a dischargeable liability. In re
Thomashefsky, 51 F.2d 1040 (2d Cir. 1931). However, a civil contempt fine imposed
on the bankrupt is provable and dischargeable. Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66
(1st Cir. 1946). See 3 CoLLEmR, BANxRuPTcy f1 63.12 (14th ed. 1956) for discussion
of provability of fines and penalties.
17. See 1 CoLLERa, BANxRuPTcY 11 17.05 (14th ed. 1956):
18. Ibid. A judgment that the bankrupt is the father of an illegitimate child,
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payable for the support of a wife,' 9 is provable. These various obligations
will be discussed further on in this article.
As the excerpt above shows, a fixed debt "absolutely owing" may be
provable under clause (1) of section 63a of the act, although it is not a
"judgment," if it is evidenced by an "instrument in writing."20 The phrase
"instrument in writing" includes any document or written evidence of the
agreement from which the debt arises, such as bonds and promissory
notes. 21 It can be seen, moreover, that the debt referred to under clause
(1) of section 63a must be "absolutely owing," although the time of pay-
ment is immaterial; the debt need not be due at the time of the filing of
the petition in order to be provable as an obligation "absolutely owing."22
A judgment obtained by the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition
may be provable against the bankrupts estate, even though the judgment
is not founded upon a provable claim. This proposition finds its best
illustration in the area of tort liabilities. Aside from certain exceptions
later to be discussed,23 tort claims, as such, cannot be proved against the
bankrupts estate. Perhaps we can best understand why tort claims are
not provable against the estate of the bankrupt if we remember that
bankruptcy laws, both in England and in our country, were first intended
only for traders, brokers and merchants-in general, those dealing in money
and in buying and selling.24 Non-traders did not enjoy the benefits of
bankruptcy until 1861.25 While the trader at present is not the only person
to whom bankruptcy can apply, nevertheless the idea has persisted that
the misfortunes of the tort-feasor were different from the financial embar-
rassments of the unfortunate debtor. Hence, tort liability as such, not
presentable as an action ex contractu, still lies beyond the scope of bank-
ruptcy. 2 However, while a tort claim is not provable (and therefore
not dischargeable), a tort judgment is provable, although based upon the
debtor's non-provable tort, provided the judgment is entered prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition.2 7 In short, one judgment ostensibly is
requiring him to pay a sum for its support, is not dischargeable. Breeden v. State
ex rel. Ferguson, 183 Tenn. 102, 191 S.W.2d 167 (1945).
19. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575
(1901).
20. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(1), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
8 103 (1958).
21. See 3 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY II 63.14 (14th ed. 1956) for a more extensive
treatment of this point.
22. See 3 CoLim, BANKRUPTCy II 63.14 (14th ed. 1956) for a discussion of this
matter.
23. See text accompanying notes 37-40 infra, and text accompanying notes 46-51
infra.
24. 1 REMNGToN, BANKmupTcY §§ 6,7 (5th ed. 1950).
25. See HANNA & MAcLAcHLAN, CASES ON CREDrons' RIGHTS 288 (5th ed. 1957).
26. Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239 (1920). See Gz.mNx, LIQUMATION §§ 361, 466
(1935); 3 ComLE1, BANxaruprcy I 63.25 (14th ed. 1956).
27. Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467 (1925).
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treated the same as another with respect to provability, with no distinction
being made regarding the grievance upon which the judgment happened
to have been obtained28 Since a verdict is not the equivalent of a judg-
ment, a tort claim upon which a verdict has been rendered, without judg-
ment having been entered, does not become provable.2 .
A tort judgment, although provable, may not be dischargeable if it falls
within the ban of section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, which, will be examined
somewhat in detail below.30 There it will be seen that a judgment founded
upon tort liability, which is exempted from the operation of a discharge,
does not become dischargeable by virtue of the fact that the non-dis-
chargeable tort claim is reduced to a provable judgment. It must never be
forgotten, of course, that provability of debts is not synonymous with dis-
chargeability of debts.
2. Taxable Costs Where Bankrupt Was Plaintiff
A second type of claim that is provable against the estate of the bank-
rupt consists of costs taxable against a bankrupt who was, at the time of
the filing of the petition by or against him, a plaintiff in a cause of action
which would pass to the trustee in bankruptcy and which the trustee de-
clines to prosecute after notice.31 In this connection, it is important to know
what causes of action will pass to the trustee in bankruptcy. In brief,
section 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the bankrupts cause
of action against a third party will pass to the trustee if (1) the bankrupt
could have transferred the cause of action, or (2) if the cause of action
could have been levied upon and sold by judicial process. 32 Whether the
28. While the proof of tort claims evidenced by a judgment indicates that the
claims are treated as having been merged in the judgment, nevertheless this doctrine
of merger has not been applied to judgments or decrees for alimony, where such claims
at one time were held not dischargeable because not provable. Such claims are ex-
pressly made nondischargeable now. See notes 121-26 infra and accompanying text.
Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 67 (1904). See 3 COLLmR, BANKRUPTcY 1 63.10 (14th
ed. 1956) for more extensive treatment of this matter.
29. See 1 CoLL=, BANmrUPTcY I[ 17.08 (14th ed. 1956).
30. See "Wilful and Malicious Injuries to Person or Property of Another," notes 86-120
infra, for a discussion on the nondischargeability of tort judgments.
31. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(2), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1958).
32. The kinds of claims that pass to the trustee in bankruptcy are set forth in § 72(5)
of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that the trustee is "vested by operation of law
with the title of the bankrupt . .. to ... (5) property, including rights of action,
which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred or
which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him, or
otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered: Provided, That rights of action ex delicto
for libel, slander, injuries to the person of the bankrupt or of a relative, whether or not
resulting in death, seduction, and criminal conversation shall not vest in the trustee
unless by the law of the State such rights of action are subject to attachment, execution,
garnishment, sequestration, or other judicial process ....... Bankruptcy Act § 70a(5),
ch. 541, 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1958).
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cause of action can be transferred or levied upon is determined by relevant
state law.3
3. Taxable Costs Where Bankrupt Was Defendant
Section 63a(3) of the Bankruptcy Act makes provable debts founded
upon costs incurred by a creditor in good faith before the filing of the peti-
tion in an action to recover a provable debt.
34
4. Debts on Open Account or Implied Contract
Section 63a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that debts of the bank-
rupt which are founded upon an open account, or a contract express or
implied,35 may be proved against his estate. Perhaps the bulk of the claims
filed in the ordinary bankruptcy proceedings fall within this category?3
This group of claims covers a balance due on a running account as well as
claims based on tort, where the tort may be waived and an action brought
on implied or quasi-contract.3 7 As we have already seen, a large class of
claims excluded from proof against the bankrupts estate are unliquidated
tort claims.38 While tort claims as such are not provable, the creditor may
nevertheless have a claim which could support either an action in tort on
the one hand, or an action in contract or quasi-contract on the other hand.
Such claims are provable under section 63a(4) of the act, even though the
claim has not been reduced to judgment.3 9 Since such claims are provable,
they are dischargeable,49 unless excepted from the operation of the dis-
charge. Whether such claims are dischargeable depends upon whether they
are excluded from the operation of the discharge by section 17 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, which will be dealt with below.
5. Judgments Recovered After Bankruptcy
The fifth class of provable claims relates to provable debts reduced to
judgment after the bankruptcy petition has been fied and before the con-
sideration of the bankrupt's application for a discharge.41 By virtue of
33. Bankruptcy Act § 70a(5), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 110 (1958).
34. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(3), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1958).
35. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(4), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1958).
36. See 3 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 63.23 (14th ed. 1956).
37. See MAcLAcHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 134 (1956).
38. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
39. Frederic L. Grant Shoe Co. v. W. M. Laird Co., 212 U.S. 445 (1909) (breach
of warranty claim); Tindle v. Birkett, 205 U.S. 183 (1907) (conversion claim); Craw-
ford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176 (1904) (conversion claim).
40. Ibid. Also, to same effect is Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934)
(technical conversion).




section 63a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, such claims are provable, less the
costs incurred after the petition was filed, provided the claim upon which
the suit is based is provable against the bankrupts estate.42
6. Workmen's Compensation Awards
The sixth class of claims that is made provable by section 63a(6) of the
Bankruptcy Act is awards by a workmen's compensation board where the
injury occurred prior to the adjudication.4 3 Prior to a 1934 amendment of
the Bankruptcy Act, workmen's compensation awards were not provable
obligations against the bankrupt.44 The reasoning of the court in denying
the provability of such a claim was that the award cannot be traced to any
contract between the employer and employee because the law is compul-
sory; nor may the award be considered as a judgment because by the very
terms of the workmen's compensation law such awards are subject to revi-
sion by the commission. 45
7. Negligence Claims
The somewhat anomalous nature of our bankruptcy laws regarding the
provability of tort claims has been shown. That is to say, a tort claim, as
such, is not provable against the bankrupt's estate; but if the tort has been
reduced to judgment before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, then the
tort judgment can be proved as a claim.46 The same anomaly further ap-
pears with respect to the provability of negligence claims against the
bankrupt where the claim has not been reduced to judgment before the
date of the petition. We have seen that the exclusion of tort claims from
the category of obligations that are provable against the estate of the
bankrupt apparently stems from the old idea that bankruptcy originally was
only for traders.4 7 It is likely that the increase in claims arising out of auto-
mobile accidents created the requisite pressure to cause Congress to take ac-
tion regarding negligence claims. The result was a 1934 amendment of sec-
tion 63 of the Bankruptcy Act, plus a 1938 clarifying amendment, providing
a half-way measure regarding the provability of negligence claims.48 A claim
for damages resulting from the negligence of the bankrupt is now provable if
an action for negligence is pending against the bankrupt tort-feasor at the
time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
49
42. Ibid.
43. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(6), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1958).
44. Lane v. Industrial Comm'r, 54 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1931).
45. Ibid.
46. See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
47. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
48. See 1 CoLLuE, BANKRUPTCY U 17.08 (14th ed. 1956) for a discussion of this
development.
49. Section 63a of the Bankruptcy Act now provides that the debts of the bankrupt
may be proved and allowed against his estate which are founded upon "(7) the right
1961 ]
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Of course, by limiting the provable tort claims to those that are based on
negligence, many actionable wrongs are excluded. Such wrongs as trespass,
libel and slander still remain as non-provable obligations against the bank-
rupt. Being non-provable, they are not discharged; instead, these claims
survive the bankruptcy and remain as obligations against the bankrupt
despite the fact that he has received a discharge in bankruptcy.
A natural result of the present law governing the provability of negli-
gence claims is that a person having a particular negligence claim hanging
over him is under pressure not to file a bankruptcy petition until after suit
is started against him on the negligence claim. On the other side of the
coin, if the tort claimant wants a non-dischargeable claim, and is willing
to forego participation in the bankrupt's then current estate, he will seek to
precipitate a bankruptcy proceeding against the tort-feasor before suit
has been started against the tort-feasor on the negligence claim.
One further test must be satisfied before the holder of a negligence claim
will be permitted to share in the assets of the bankrupt's estate. Not only
must his claim be provable (action pending at time petition is filed), but
the claim must also be allowable. Since a claim based on negligence is
unliquidated, it will be allowed as a claim against the bankrupts estate
only when it has been liquidated within the time and in the manner di-
rected by the court.5 0 If such liquidation will unduly delay the administra-
tion of the bankrupt's estate, then the claim will not be allowed.5'
Whether a provable negligence claim will then be dischargeable depends
upon whether the tort was tinctured with the ingredients of one of the
categories of claims that are made non-dischargeable by reason of section
17 of the Bankruptcy Act. Further on in this article the dischargeability
of claims growing out of automobile accidents will be discussed.
52
By way of summary and recapitulation, it has been shown that tort claims
generally are not provable against the bankrupt's estate, and consequently
are not dischargeable. In the early history of bankruptcy only commercial
debts were provable, and this historical development apparently continues
to influence bankruptcy law. In more recent years the scope of provable
claims has been expanded to include some tort claims, such as tort judg-
ments obtained prior to bankruptcy;
53 workmen's compensation awards;54
claims where the tort may be waived and proof made in contract or quasi-
to recover damages in any action for negligence instituted prior to and pending at
the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy." Bankruptcy Act § 63a, ch. 541,
30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1958).
50. Bankruptcy Act § 57d, 52 Stat. 866 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 93 (1958).
51. Ibid. Section 63d of the Bankruptcy Act provides that claims disallowed for
this reason shall be deemed not provable. Bankruptcy Act § 63d, ch. 541, 30 Stat.
562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1958).
52. See notes 108-20 infra and accompanying text.
53. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
54. See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
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contract;5 5 and negligence claims where an action is pending against the
bankrupt tort-feasor at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,56
provided the liquidation of the negligence claim will not unduly delay the
administration of the bankrupt's estate.57
8. Contingent Debts and Contingent Contractual Liabilities
By and large, contingent claims were not provable prior to 1938. How-
ever, by a far-reaching amendment of the Bankruptcy Act in 1938, contin-
gent debts and contingent contractual liabilities were expressly made
provable obligations against a bankrupts estate.58 This was accomplished
by the addition of section 63a(8) of the Bankruptcy Act.59
But such contingent debts and contingent contractual liabilities are
subject to the limitation imposed by section 57d of the Bankruptcy Act.
This section provides that such claims will not be allowed as claims against
the bankrupts estate unless they are capable of reasonable estimation, and
unless they can be liquidated without unduly delaying the administration
of the bankrupts estate.60 Where such a contingent or unliquidated claim
has been proved, but has not been allowed, the Act provides that the
claim shall not be deemed provable.61 That means, of course, that such
disallowed claims are not discharged, since only claims that are made
provable under the Bankruptcy Act may be discharged.62
Perhaps a word should be said about the claim of an accommodation
party where his principal debtor is the bankrupt. The accommodation
party's claim, of course, is contingent, but he may file a claim against the
estate of the bankrupt principal debtor if the creditor fails to file a proof
of claim. However, the accommodation party files in the name of the
55. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
56. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
58. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 63.30 (14th ed. 1956).
59. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(8), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1958).
60. A loan by a creditor to the bankrupt to be repaid from the proceeds of the
bankrupt's business "as soon as said business is in a sound financial position" was
held not capable of reasonable estimation so as to satisfy section 57d of the Bankruptcy
Act; hence it was not provable. Thompson v. England, 226 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1955).
See also Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U.S. 273 (1931), which is regarded as a leading case in
this area. For a history of efforts to make contingent claims provable before the 1938
amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, see 3 COLLum, BANKRUPTCY ff 57.15 (14th ed.
1956); MAcLAcaLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 139 (1956).
61. Bankruptcy Act § 63d, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1958).
62. Bankruptcy Act § 17a, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35
(1958). See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text for further elaboration of this
point. For a discussion of the history of provability of contingent claims, see MAC-
LACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 139 (1956).
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creditor.63 If the accommodation party has paid the debt in full before the
filing of the bankruptcy petition against the principal debtor, then he is
subrogated to the rights of the creditor and may file a proof of claim in his
own name.64
9. Claims for Future Rent and Damages for Anticipatory Breach of Contract
As early as 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States handed down a
decision which authoritatively established that a claim for anticipatory
breach of contract constituted a provable obligation in bankruptcy.65 Bank-
ruptcy itself, of course, constitutes an anticipatory breach of contract if the
trustee rejects the contract.66
The landlord has always had a provable claim for rent that had accrued
before the bankruptcy petition was filed.67 As for claims for rent arising
after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the landlord had no provable
claim prior to 1934. Until that date such claims were not provable because
a lease was viewed, not as a contract, but as a real property arrangement
under which claims for damages could arise only in connection with con-
tinued use and occupation of the premises; rent, like a profit, was thought
to issue only out of the land as the rent came due.68 Hence, claims for
future rent would not be allowed against the bankrupts estate. Lawyers
are an ingenious lot, however, and various devices were tried with a view
to making a claim for future rent a provable debt against the bankrupt
lessee's estate. It thus developed in the decisional law that a liquidated
damage clause in a lease would be regarded as a contract claim and there-
fore provable. It worked in this fashion. A covenant would be inserted in
the lease, creating a liability for damages on the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy, measured by the difference between the present fair value of
the remaining rent and the present fair rental value of the premises for the
balance of the term. This device produced a provable contract claim for
future rent.69 Such a condition resulted in inequality among creditors, as
well as among bankrupts, since recovery by claimants depended solely
63. Bankruptcy Act § 57i, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 560 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 93
(1958).
64. Bankruptcy Act § 57i, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 560 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 93 (1958).
65. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U.S. 581 (1916).
66. Bankruptcy Act § 63c, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 560 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1958).
67. See 3 CoL..L , BANKRuPTcY 63.32 (14th ed. 1956).
68. See Irving Trust Co. v. A. W. Perry, Inc., 293 U.S. 307 (1934) and Oldden
v. Tonto Realty Corp., 143 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1944) for a recognition of these doc-
trines.
69. Efforts by lawyers to make such claims provable obligations reached fruition in
Irving Trust Co. v. A. W. Perry, Inc., 293 U.S. 307 (1934). See Connecticut Ry. &
Lighting Co. v. Palmer, 305 U.S. 493, 497 (1939). See Note, 9 NoTnE DmiE LAW.
423 (1934), collating the types of leases or covenants drawn to circumvent the general
rule that claims for future rent are not provable against the bankrupts estate.
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upon the artistry with which their leases were drafted, and discharged
bankrupts were often left saddled with surviving claims for rent, thus
hobbling their efforts at rehabilitation.
By amendments to the Bankruptcy Act in 1934, Congress provided that
claims for anticipatory breaches of contract, including leases of real or
personal property, should be provable claims.70 These amendments then
limit provable landlords' claims to injury resulting from the rejection by
the trustee of such unexpired lease or for damages or indemnity under a
covenant contained in such lease, limiting the provable damages at one year
in bankruptcy and three years in reorganizations.71 The present sections
of the Bankruptcy Act allowing claims for future rent or for damages under
a lease obviously were a compromise, making future rent claims provable
(and dischargeable), but only in a limited amount. Future rent claims for
the residue of the lease remain nonprovable liabilities against bankrupts.
B. The Time for Determining the Existence of a Provable Indebtedness
As a general rule, the provability of a claim depends upon its status at
the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.72 The filing of the peti-
tion in bankruptcy, by and large, stops the clock in so far as the creation
of provable claims is concerned. There are certain exceptions. Thus, sec-
tion 63b of the Bankruptcy Act provides that in the interval after the filing
of an involuntary petition and before the appointment of a receiver or the
70. The Bankruptcy Act now expressly makes claims for unexpired leases of real
or personal property provable. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(9), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898),
as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(9) (1958). Rent claims also are made provable
obligations in corporate reorganizations, Bankruptcy Act § 202, 52 Stat. 893 (1938), 11
U.S.C. § 602 (1958), and in arrangements, Bankruptcy Act § 353, 52 Stat. 910 (1938),
11 U.S.C. § 753 (1958).
71. Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which
are founded upon "(9) claims for anticipatory breach of contracts, executory in
whole or in part, including unexpired leases of real or personal property: Prodded,
however, That the claim of a landlord for damages for injury resulting from the re-
jection of an unexpired lease of real estate or for damages or indemnity under a
covenant contained in such lease shall in no event be allowed in an amount exceed-
ing the rent reserved by the lease, without acceleration for the year next succeeding
the date of the surrender of the premises to the landlord or the date of reentry of the
landlord, whichever first occurs .... " Bankruptcy Act § 63a(9), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562
(1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(9) (1958). Oldden v. Tonto Realty Corp.,
143 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1944) held that the landlord could not prove for a years rent
in addition to a deposit which he had required the tenant to put up to secure rent
payments. The Court thought that would enable the landlord to get more than one
year's rent. In corporate reorganizations, and in arrangements, claims up to a maximum
of rent for three years are provable. Bankruptcy Act § 353, 52 Stat. 910 (1938), 11
U.S.C. § 753 (1958) (arrangements); Bankruptcy Act § 202, 52 Stat. 893 (1938), 11
U.S.C. § 602 (1958) (corporate reorganizations).
72. United States v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200, 207 (1939) ("[Tlhe rights of creditors
are fixed by the Bankruptcy Act as of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. This is
true both as to the bankrupt and among themselves."). See 3 CoLLIMR, BANIRUVTCY"
fI 63.04 (14th ed. 1956).
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adjudication, whichever occurs first, a claim arising in favor of a creditor
by reason of property transferred or services rendered by the creditor to
the bankrupt for the benefit of the estate is provable to the extent of the
value of such property or services.73 Moreover, as was pointed out above,
workmen's compensation awards are provable where the injury occurs prior
to the bankruptcy adjudication.74
III. No CiscAR GFBLE DEBTS
As mentioned above, section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the
discharge shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts, except
certain obligations which are not affected by the discharge even though
they may be provable as claims against the bankrupts estate.75 Section 17
then goes on to specify certain classes of provable debts that are not dis-
chargeable. That means that any claim against the bankrupt which falls
within one or more of these classes rides through the bankruptcy, and the
discharge will not be a defense to the claim. Even though the creditor
proves his claim in the bankruptcy proceeding and receives a dividend on
his claim from the bankrupts estate, the discharge will not be a defence
to the residue of a claim that is of a nondischargeable variety.75a
1. Taxes
Section 17a(1) expressly excepts from the effect of a discharge provable
debts which "are due as a tax levied by the United States, or any State,
county, district, or municipality."76 The bankrupt is thus not able to shift
to others his obligation to contribute to the support of governmental units.
The inability of the bankrupt to shake off tax liabilities through a bank-
ruptcy discharge has produced much hardship on bankrupts due to the
increasing number and weight of taxes. The National Bankruptcy Con-
ference, American Bar Association committees, and the Committee on
Bankruptcy of the Commercial Law League of America have advocated
amending the Bankruptcy Act so as to discharge tax debts except for taxes
for which the bankrupt has become liable (1) within one year before
bankruptcy; (2) before such year, if not assessed because of failure to
make a return required by law; or (3) before such year if the bankrupt
73. Bankruptcy Act § 636, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §
103(b) (1958).
74. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(6), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 103(a)(6) (1958).
75. Bankruptcy Act § 17a, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §
35(a) (1958). See Smedley, Determination of the Effect of a Discharge in Bankruptcy,
15 Vmsm. L. REv. 49 (1961).
75a. Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555 (1885).




made a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade the tax.77
H.R. 4473, a bill introduced into the 87th Congress, First Session, would
carry out proposals similar to these, except that it limits the nondis-
chargeability of tax claims to a period of three years prior to bankruptcy
and permits the discharge of taxes which accrue prior to that period.
2. Liability for Obtaining Money or Property Under False Pretenses
One of the very large categories of nondischargeable liabilities are those
arising from the bankrupts obtaining money or property by false pretenses
or false representations.7 8 Section 17a(2) of the act expressly excepts from
the effect of a discharge "liabilities for obtaining money or property by false
pretenses or false representations, or for obtaining money or property on
credit or obtaining the extension or renewal of credit in reliance upon a ma-
terially false statement respecting his financial condition made or published
or caused to be made or published in any manner whatever with intent to
deceive...."79
Troublesome questions arise as to what constitutes a "false pretense or
false representation." Thus, a promise to be executed by the bankrupt in
the future is not sufficient to render a debt nondischargeable, even though
there is no excuse for the subsequent breach by the bankrupt.80 However,
a misrepresentation by the bankrupt of his intention may amount to a false
representation, which will serve as a basis for excluding the claim from
the operation of the discharge. Hence, a purchase of goods on credit by
a bankrupt who has no intention of paying for them constitutes a false
representation.81 A loan induced by a false financial statement is not
77. For a discussion of this problem and these proposals, see Olive, Taxes in Bank-
ruptcy Proceedings, 25 TAXEs 5 (1947).
78. See Rifkind, Bankruptcy Law: Non-Dischargeable Debts, 45 A.B.A.J. 685, 686
(1959).
79. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 35(a) (2) (1958). For an exhaustive treatment of this class of non-dischargeable
liabilities, see I CoLLmR, BANmUPTCY ff 17.16 (14th ed. 1956).
80. Ames v. Moir, 138 U.S. 306 (1891); Proctor Sec. Corp. v. Handler, 7 Misc. 2d
9, 162 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Lilly v. Barron, 1A4 Ark. 422, 222 S.W. 712
(1920).
81. Forsyth v. Vehmeyer, 177 U.S. 177 (1900) (bankrupt falsely represented that
he had certain assets with which to pay); Wells v. Blitch, 182 Ga. 826, 187
S.E. 86 (1936). In Davison-Paxon Co. v. Caldwell, 115 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1940),
cert., dehied, 313 U.S. 564 (1941), the court held that the debt was dischargeable
even though credit was obtained through the concealment of insolvency and present
inability to pay. This case has been subject to critical comment. 54 HIAsv. L. REv.
873 (1941); 89 U. PA. L. REv. 979 (1941). Furthermore, the Caldwell case seems to
run counter to several state court decisions. Thus, in Crawford v. Davison-Paxon Co.,
46 Ga. App. 161, 166 S.E. 872 (1932), it was held that a purchase by one who was
so grossly insolvent that he must be presumed not to have intended to pay, constituted
an- obtaining of property by false pretenses within this exception of the Bankruptcy
Act, thus preventing a discharge of the debt. See also Rowell v. Ricker, 79 Vt. 552,




A bankrupt is bound by the fraud of an agent acting within the scope
of his authority;83 therefore, a fraudulent representation by one partner
within the scope of the partnership business will be imputed to the
remaining partners, and the debt as to the remaining partners will not be
released by a discharge.84 It is not necessary that the false statement be
made to the particular creditor who is seeking to have the debt excepted
from the operation of the discharge; it is enough that such false statements
were made to a mercantile agency in order to obtain credit, and the creditor
relied upon such statement, and property was obtained from the bankrupt
as the result thereof.85
3. Wilful and Malicious Injuries to Person or Property of Another
Several diverse exceptions from a bankruptcy discharge are lumped
together under the second clause of section 17a of the Bankruptcy Act.
Thus, as we have just seen, the exception concerning liabilities for obtaining
money or property under false pretenses or false representations is con-
tained in the second clause.8 6 Likewise contained in the second clause of
section 17a is the exception which provides that liabilities for wilful and
malicious injuries to person or property of another are not dischargeable.87
Thus, claims for wilful and malicious injuries to the person or property of
another are exempt from discharge, even though the claims may be
provable against the estate of the bankrupt and share in the estate.88 The
"wilful and malicious" injuries to the person or property of another which
are not dischargeable obligations relate generally, of course, to torts, rather
than to breaches of contract.
The phrase "wilful and malicious" has received considerable construction
by the courts, and has been construed to mean that the injuries must have
been both wilful and malicious.P But an injury to person or property may
be a wilful and malicious injury, and excepted from the discharge, if it
is wrongful and without just cause or excuse, even in the absence of
82. In re Alvino, 111 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1940); Personal Fin. Corp. v. Robinson,
27 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
83. In re Maloof, 2 F.2d 373 (N.D. Ga. 1924).
84. Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555 (1885); Griffin v. Bergeda, 152 Tenn. 512, 279
S.W. 385 (1926).
85. Friend v. Talcott, 228 U.S. 27 (1913) (claim was not dischargeable since
bankrupt obtained the sale through false representations).
86. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 35 (1958).
87. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 35 (1958).
88. See 1 COLLIm, BAimup cY 17.03 (Supp. 1961).
89. See In re Levitan, 224 Fed. 241 (D.N.J. 1915); In re Kubiniec, 2 F. Supp. 632
(W.D.N.Y. 1932); Seward v. Gatlin, 193 Tenn. 299, 246 S.W.2d 21 (1952). See
Bffkind, Bankruptcy Law: Non-Dischargeable Debts, 45 A.B.A.J. 685, 687 (1959).
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personal hatred, spite or ill will.9 0 'ilful" seems to mean nothing more
than intentional.91 Thus, a wrongful act done intentionally, which neces-
sarily produces harm and is without just cause or excuse, constitutes a
wilful and malicious injury.92
Injuries within the meaning of "wilful and malicious" are not confined to
physical damage or destruction. An injury to intangible property rights is
mfficient.93 Thus, it was held many years ago that a deliberate conversion
of corporate stock by the bankrupt, without justification and excuse, con-
stituted a wilful and malicious injury to property, and that a claim based
upon such conversion is not dischargeable.94 However, a technical conver-
sion may well not constitute a wilful and malicious injury to property,
necessary to except the liability from discharge.9 5 Damages resulting from
a wrongful attachment have been held to fall within the purview of wilful
and malicious injury to property.96 Appropriation of funds of a dissolved
partnership by a partner likewise constitutes a wilful and malicious injury
to property.
97
A judgment based on physical injuries to the person of another, of course,
90. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904), held that a judgment obtained by a
husband against the bankrupt for damages for criminal conversation is predicated
upon a liability for wilful and malicious injury, and therefore not dischargeable, even
though the wife consented and the bankrupt had no personal malevolence toward the
husband. In re Halper, 82 Misc. 205, 143 N.Y. Supp. 1005 (New York City Ct. 1913),
points out that "wilful and malicious" injury does not involve hatred or ill-will as a
state of mind, but is present when a wrongful act is done intentionally without just
cause or excuse. See also Henderson v. Freshour, 199 Tenn. 539, 287 S.W.2d 929
(1956) to the same effect. See 1 CoLLiER, Bqx urTcY ff 17.17 (14th ed. 1956) for a
more extensive discussion of the meaning of "wilful and malicious" injury. Presently
we will see the application of the "wilful and malicious" injury exception to the dis-
charge of judgments growing out of automobile collisions. See notes 108-120 infra
and accompanying text.
91. See Peters v. United States ex rel. Kelley, 177 Fed. 885 (7th Cir. 1910); Orrill
v. District Court, 324 Mass. 8, 84 N.E.2d 459 (1949).
92. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904); In re Drowne, 124 F. Supp. 842 (D.R.I.
1954); McChristal v. Clisbee, 190 Mass. 120, 76 N.E. 511 (1906); Weeks v. Streicher,
74 Ohio App. 253, 58 N.E.2d 415 (1943); Fleshman v. Trolinger, 18 Tenn. App. 208,
74 S.W.2d 1069 (E.S. 1934). See Bifkind, Bankruptcy Law: Non-Dischargeable Debts,
45 A.B.A.J. 685, 687 (1959), collecting many cases illustrating the meaning of "wilful
and malicious" injuries.
93. See 1 CoLL m, BANKRUPTCY f 17.17 (14th ed. 1956).
94. McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Fant, 181
Tenn. 492, 181 S.W.2d 753 (1944). See Annot., 98 A.L.R. 1454 (1935), for collection
of cases of conversion preventing a discharge.
95. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934) (sale without consent
by a car dealer who had cars under trust receipt was not wilful and malicious injury
where prior dealings had permitted such sale); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v.
Lineberry, 320 Mass. 510, 70 N.E.2d 308 (1946); Brown v. Garey, 267 N.Y. 167, 196
N.E. 12 (1935). See Annot., 98 A.L.R. 1454, 1458 (1935), for collection of cases
of conversions by bankrupt which did not prevent the debt from being discharged.
96. Barbachano v. Allen, 192 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1951).
97. Lyon v. Prescott, 103 Vt. 442, 156 AUt. 679 (1931).
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can constitute a nondisehargeable claim, by reason of the fact that the
injuries were wilfully and maliciously inflicted. Thus, liabilities arising from
an assault or an assault and battery are generally considered to be founded
upon a wilful and malicious injury and are, therefore, not dischargeable.9 8
Damages resulting from an assault upon a boy with an air gun to frighten
him away have been held nondischargeable, because wilful and malicious.9
Injuries to character, reputation, good name and fame can constitute the
basis of a nondischargeable claim, by virtue of the fact that such injuries
are wilful and malicious. Thus, a judgment obtained in an action for
slander'00 or libel' 01 may fall within the category of wilful and malicious
injuries. A judgment based on malicious prosecution 10 2 and a judgment
for false imprisonment 03 can be based upon a nondischargeable wilful
and malicious injury. A judgment for alienation of affection likewise is not
dischargeable. 0 4
While a claim based merely upon simple negligence does not, of course,
constitute such a wilful and malicious injury as to be nondischargeable,
nevertheless the line between "wilful and malicious" action, on the one
hand, and various degrees of negligence on the other, is often considerably
blurred. The judicial well-spring for the view that negligence is not
tantamount to "wilful and malicious" conduct seems to be a dictum in the
1904 United States Supreme Court case of Tinker v. Colwell,105 where
Justice Peckham declared that "one who negligently drives through a
crowded thoroughfare and negligently runs over an individual would not, as
we suppose," commit a nondischargeable act. Since the date of that
judicial declaration, there has been a plethora of cases dealing with the
question whether various degrees of negligence can amount to "wilful and
malicious" injury.10 6
The Tinker opinion also undertook to establish additional guide lines for
determining the purview of "wilful and malicious" conduct which would
give rise to a nondischargeable claim. The Court said, in part: "[A] willful
98. Western Sur. Co. v. Rich, 141 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Okla. 1956); In re Drowne,
124 F. Supp. 842 (D.R.I. 1954); Kite v. Hamblen, 192 Tenn. 643, 241 S.W.2d 601
(1951).
99. In re Drowne, 124 F. Supp. 842 (D.R.I. 1954).
100. In re Dowie, 202 Fed. 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
101. Thompson v. Judy, 169 Fed. 553 (6th Cir. 1909).
102. Koch v. Segler, 331 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. App. 1960). See Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d
1226 (1961), for collection of cases holding that judgment based on malicious prose-
cution is a wilful and malicious injury, and therefore not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
103. McChristal v. Clisbee, 190 Mass. 120, 76 N.E. 511 (1906).
104. Leicester v. Hoadley, 66 Kan. 172, 71 Pac. 318 (1903); Ernst v. Wise, 94
N.E.2d 806 (Ohio C.P. 1950).
105. 193 U.S: 473, 489 (1904). The justice no doubt was thinking about the
negligent operation of a horse and buggy rather than the present-day automobile. This
case actually involved the dischargeability of a judgment for criminal conversation.
106. See 1 COLLIR, BAMRUPTCY ff 17.17 (14th ed. 1956) for cases.
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disregard of what one knows to be his duty, an act which is against good
morals and wrongful in and of itself, and which necessarily causes injury
and is done intentionally, may be said to be done willfully and mali-
ciously."10 7 It was not a long step from this judicially created concept of
what constitutes "wilful and malicious" conduct to the conclusion that
"wilful and wanton" conduct likewise is sufficient to constitute wilful and
malicious injury to persons and property.108 This idea has carried over
into the field of litigation involving liabilities resulting from injuries inflicted
by motorists, resulting in a prolific source of litigation revolving around
the dischargeability of the claim of an aggrieved party.10 9
The upshot of this development has been a great deal of authority deny-
ing a discharge from a particular obligation where the bankrupt-motorist
is guilty of various degrees of recklessness, especially where there is a
combination of several acts of wrongful conduct causing the injury.110
107. 193 U.S. at 487.
108. McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138 (1916) (unexcused and wanton con-
version); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Fant, 181 Tenn. 492, 181 S.W.2d 753 (1944) (con-
version by way of theft). See 8 REmINGToN, BANxRUPTcy § 3328 (6th ed. 1955).
109. See NADLER, BA -rUPTCY § 786 (1948).
110. Haerynck v. Thompson, 228 F.2d 72 (10th Cir. 1955) (pleading alleged that
bankrupt was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; that he failed
to keep his automobile under control; that he failed to keep a proper lookout; and
that he drove at an excessive rate of speed, in wilful and wanton disregard of the
rights of other users of the highway); Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F.2d 588 (8th Cir.
1946) (default judgment for punitive damages for injuries caused where motorist in
wanton and reckless disregard of the safety of others was driving truck on wrong
side of road while intoxicated); In re Greene, 87 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1937) (excessive
and dangerous rate of speed, nnning stop signal); In re Dutkiewicz, 27 F.2d 334
(W.D.N.Y. 1928) (complaint alleged that defendant negligently, carelessly and wan-
tonly drove his auto head-on against claimant on wrong side of road); Fitzgerald v.
Herzer, 78 Cal. App. 2d 127, 177 P.2d 364 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (default judgment
where complainant merely pleaded bankrupt defendant guilty of grossly negligent and
reckless conduct); Breitowich v. Standard Process Corp., 323 IM. App. 261, 55 N.E.2d
392 (1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 801 (1945) (red light crashing); Reell v. Central
Ill. Elec. & Gas Co., 317 Ill. App. 106, 45 N.E.2d 500 (1942) (declaration charged that
bankrupt recklessly, wilfully and wantonly operated automobile); Rosen v. Shingleur,
47 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 1950) (motorist drunk); McClure v. Steele, 326 Mich. 286,
40 N.W.2d 153 (1949) (declaration charged negligence that was wilful, wanton,
gross and malicious); Greenfield v. Tucillo, 129 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1942) (running
red light, speeding, guilty of criminal negligence); Margulies v. Garwood, 178 Misc.
970, 36 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (driving on wrong side of highway, speeding,
guilty of reckless driving); Doty v. Rogers, 213 S.C. 361, 49 S.E.2d 594 (1948) (driv-
ing on wrong side of highway at excessive speed while intoxicated and colliding at
crest of hill); Henderson v. Freshour, 199 Tenn. 539, 287 S.W.2d 929 (1956) (driving
while under influence of intoxicants; failing to keep automobile under control; failing
to keep proper lookout; driving at excessive rate of speed, in wilful and wanton dis-
regard of rights of others); Saueressig v. Jung, 246 Wis. 82, 16 N.W.2d 417 (1944)
(operating automobile in a drunken condition in a reckless, wilful and wanton disregard
of the safety of others).
It is difficult to determine just what many of the cases mean with respect to wilful
and malicious conduct of the bankrupt, since the creditor's pleadings in his tort action
against the bankrupt-tort-feasor are often festooned with profuse and at times incon-
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Where the judgment against the bankrupt-motorist for injuries inflicted
contains an award of punitive damages, the courts are in disagreement on
whether this facet of the case by itself is enough to justify the conclusion
that the injury was wilful and malicious, so as to bar the dischargeability
of the claim. Under the law of some states punitive damages can be
awarded even though the tort-feasor's conduct was not wilful, and in these
jurisdictions an award of punitive damages against the bankrupt does not,
of itself, render the tort judgment nondischargeable."' Much respectable
authority, however, has taken the position that a judgment for punitive
damages against the bankrupt because of "wanton and reckless" operation
of his motor vehicle is conclusive evidence of every element of "wilful
and malicious conduct."112 The fact that no punitive damages were awarded
does not, of course, make the judgment dischargeable."
3
Many courts, however, take the position that no degree of negligence-
even gross negligence-can produce a wilful and malicious injury. Under
this view a liability arising out of automobile accidents is dischargeable
however great the degree of negligence.1 14 Courts of this persuasion take
sistent (e.g., allegations that tort-feasor wilfully and negligently injured creditor) verbi-
age. Many of the opinions do not make clear just what was found as a fact, because the
verdicts ordinarily are general. The cases are complicated by another factor in this
respect. When the declaration in a tort action contains several counts, some based
on malice and others on negligence only, and the verdict is general-which is often
the case-the courts are split on whether the verdict was based upon the cause of
action involving malice. Some courts hold that, in such cases, there is a presumption
that the verdict is based upon the cause of action involving malice. Buck v. Alex, 350
Ill. 167, 182 N.E. 794 (1932). Other courts are contra on such a presumption. In re
De Lauro, 1 F. Supp. 678 (D. Conn. 1932); Freedman v. Cooper, 126 N.J.L. 177, 17
A.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. 1941). It seems that Tennessee falls in this latter category. See
Seward v. Gatlin, 193 Tenn. 299, 246 S.W.2d 21 (1952).
111. Seward v. Gatlin, 193 Tenn. 299, 246 S.W.2d 21 (1952); Randolph v. Edmonds,
185 Tenn. 37, 202 S.W.2d 664 (1947).
112. Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F.2d 588, (8th Cir. 1946); San Francisco & Suburban
Soc'y Bldg. v. Leonard, 17 Cal. App. 254, 119 Pac. 405 (Dist. Ct. App. 1911); 7
REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 814 (6th ed. 1955). In In re Buzas, 58 F. Supp. 717 (N.D.
Cal. 1944), the court considered punitive damages as prima facie evidence of wilful
and malicious conduct.
113. In re Wernecke, 1 F. Supp. 127 (W.D.N.Y. 1932); In re Franks, 49 F.2d 389,
(W.D. Pa. 1931); Thibodeau v. Martin, 140 Me. 179, 35 A.2d 653 (1944).
114. In re Wegner, 88 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1937) (wanton and reckless conduct
charged); In re Ellman, 48 F. Supp. 518 (W.D.N.Y. 1942) (culpable and wilful negli-
gence charged); In re Tillery, 16 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ga. 1936) (dischargeable
however great the negligence); Rogers v. Doody, 119 Conn. 532, 178 Atl. 51 (1935)
(injuries resulting from reckless disregard of rights of others); Prater v. King, 73 Ga.
App. 393, 37 S.E.2d 155 (1946) (dischargeable however great the negligence);
Seward v. Gatlin, 193 Tenn. 299, 246 S.W.2d 21 (1952). But cf. Henderson v.
Freshour, 199 Tenn. 539, 287 S.W.2d 929 (1956). Elsewhere, the writer has sug-
gested that Henderson sapped the vitality of the Seward rationale, and further sug-
gested that Henderson reaches a result that is more consonant with the purposes and
objectives of the discharge feature of the Bankruptcy Act. See Hartman, Creditors-
Rights-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VAND. L. Rtv. 974, 976 (1956). Some writers
think that the majority of courts adhere to the theory that negligence, however gross,
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the position that exceptions tend to impair the bankrupts remedy, and that
since the Bankruptcy Act is highly remedial, these exceptions to the dis-
charge of a debt should be so construed as to affect that remedy only so
far as is necessarily required by the express terms of the act.115
Much criticism has been levied on the notion that a bankrupt-motorist
should be able to wipe clean his slate by obtaining a discharge in bank-
ruptcy and thereby ridding himself of a judgment arising out of an auto-
bile accident. Members of the judiciary have been among those who have
most vigorously voiced the view that liabilities resulting from automobile
accidents should not be dischargeable. This position is well illustrated by
the language of the court in Francine v. Babayan:
116
If the Court were permitted to do moral justice instead of legal justice it would
refuse to discharge the bankrupt of the judgments. There are too many accidents
resulting in judgments which are wiped out in bankruptcy. The practice has grown
up wherein a person will negligently operate his automobile and then when a
judgment for such injuries is filed against him, will obtain the protection of the
Bankruptcy Law by filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. . . .Operators of
automobiles may drive in a careless and negligent manner and go unscathed of
justice by filing a petition in bankruptcy.
Motor vehicles have become instruments of terror and destruction when
in the hands of speed maniacs. One might well inquire, as did a Louisiana
court, whether the Bankruptcy Act was ever intended to shield such persons
from the consequences of their indifference and utter disregard for the
safety of others.117 The purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, as stated by the
most authoritative tribunal on that subject, is "to relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh
free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business
misfortunes.""18
Some states have found a partially effective way to prevent negligent
drivers from using the bankruptcy discharge as a passport to the privileged
sanctuary of financial safety. Legislatures have enacted statutes giving
authority to revoke driving permits until tort judgments are paid, and
providing that a discharge in bankruptcy shall not relieve the judgment
debtor from the revocation. Over the objection that such statutes are in
contravention of the Bankruptcy Act, the, Supreme Court of the United
States has upheld such a statute which provided for the suspension of the
cannot produce nondisehargeable wilful and malicious injury. See NADLER, BANK-
nuprcy § 786 (1948); Laugharn, Can Automobile Accident Judgments Be Discharged
in Bankruptcy?, 20 REF. J. 110, 111 (1946).
115. E.g., Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 41, 202 S.W.2d 664 (1947); Note,
Dischargeability of Bankrupts Liability for Personal Injuries Caused by Reckless Driv-
ing, 11 WAsH. & LEE L. lv. 176 (1954), reprinted in 29 REF. J. 70 (1955).
116. 45 F. Supp. 321, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
117. Rosen v. Shingleur, 47 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 1950).
118. Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554 (1915).
1961 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
license of the operator of an automobile because of an unsatisfied judgment
against the bankrupt arising from motor car operation by him, even though
the bankruptcy petition was filed after the judgment was taken." 9
For further public protection against the increasingly alarming menace
of recklessness on the highways, it might be well for Congress to consider
extending the scope of nondischargeable obligations so as to reach more
liabilities arising out of motor vehicle injuries. 20
4. Alimony
Section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act expressly provides that a discharge
in bankruptcy does not release a bankrupt from alimony due or to become
due.'2 ' This provision of the Bankruptcy Act was put there by an amend-
ment in 1903.122 But prior to that amendment it had been held that an
award for alimony was not barred by a discharge in bankruptcy on the
ground that alimony was not a provable claim against the bankrupt's
estate. 23 Under this exception from the discharge, an award of counsel
fees under a statute permitting the court to require payment of such fees
by the husband in a matrimonial matter is a nondischargeable obligation of
the bankrupt. 24 Likewise not dischargeable is a judgment for costs obtained
in an action for alimony.ns However, an obligation to make payments under
a property settlement agreement, incorporated into the divorce decree, is a
dischargeable obligation.126
5. Liabilities for Maintenance and Support
Section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act also provides that a discharge in
bankruptcy shall not be a defense to claims for maintenance or support of
wife or child.127 This exception from the operation of a discharge was also
119. Rietz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941) (New York statute involved). Other
states have taken a page out of Mealey in passing financial responsibility statutes re-
quiring license suspension of discharged debtors until satisfaction of accident judgments.
Doyle v. Kabl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52 (1951); De Vries v. Alger, 329 Mich. 68,
44 N.W.2d 872 (1950); Smith v. Hayes, 133 N.E.2d 443 (Ohio C.P. 1955).
120. In Francine v. Babayan, 45 F. Supp. 321 (E.D.N.Y. 1942), although the court
deplored doing so, it felt driven to the conclusion that under present law, the liability
resulting from an automobile injury was dischargeable. The court felt that the remedy
for such a miscarriage of justice is not for the courts to provide.
121. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 35 (1958).
122. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, ch. 487,
32 Stat. 798 (1903), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1958).
123. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340
(1903).
124. In re Brennen, 39 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Merriman v. Hawbaker, 5
F. Supp. 432 (E.D. IlM. 1934).
125. Smith v. Smith, 7 F. Supp. 490 (W.D.N.Y. 1934).
126. Goggans v, Osborn, 237 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1956).




made part of the Bankruptcy Act by an amendment in 1903.m2 However,
prior to the date of the amendment, such claims were not barred by a
discharge, for they were treated as nonprovable (and hence nondischarge-
able) obligations of the bankrupt. 2 9 This clause of the Bankruptcy Act,
which provides that obligations for maintenance or support of a wife or
child are not dischargeable, covers only the liability involuntarily imposed
upon a husband and father by the common law for support of wife or
child.130 It is immaterial that the liability is imposed for the support of an
illegitimate child; it remains nondischargeable.131 Since the exception to
the operation of a discharge applies only to liabilities involuntarily imposed
by law, the discharge, rather strangely, will be a defense to the husband
or parent's contractual liability to third parties for necessaries furnished for
the wife or child.132 Thus, a husband or father's liability for goods purchased
from a third party, and used by the wife or child, will be barred by a
discharge,133 even for medical services furnished.134 In holding that the
bankrupts discharge released him from a debt for clothing purchased for
his children and used by them (found to be necessaries), the court reasoned
that the "purchaser was free to do what he liked with the goods. They
were a matter of free bargain and sale."135
The nondischargeable nature of a husband's liabilities for maintenance
or support of his wife and children extends to the situation where the duty
to support has been expressly provided for in a contract between the
husband and wife. 36 Consequently, the husband's liabilities for payments
128. See note 122 supra. See 1 CoLLuN, BA mKupTcY ff 17.19 (14th ed. 1956), con-
taining a more extensive treatment of this subject.
129. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340 (1903); In re Baker, 96 Fed. 954 (D.C. Kan.
1899).
130. See In re Lo Grasso, 23 F. Supp. 340 (N.D.N.Y. 1938); General Protestant
Orphans' Home v. Ivey, 240 F.2d 239, 240 (6th Cir. 1956). A court order to support
a child in a state humane institution is not dischargeable. State v. Murzyn, 142 Conn.
329, 114 A.2d 210 (1955). However, where the commissioner of welfare obtained a
judgment against the debtor pursuant to a state law imposing an obligation on the
debtor for relief payments made to debtor's wife and family at a time when he had
sufficient property for their support, the obligation was discharged in bankruptcy. Hil-
liard v. De Ciuceis, 202 Misc. 197, 115 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
131. Breeden v. State ex rel. Ferguson, 183 Tenn. 102, 191 S.W.2d 167 (1945).
132. General Protestant Orphans' Home v. Ivey, 240 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1956)
(claim of orphan's home for board and room furnished to bankrupts three children,
held, dischargeable); In re Ostrander, 139 Fed. 592 (D.C.N.Y. 1905); Schwoll v.
Meeks, 76 Ohio App. 231, 63 N.E.2d 831 (1944) (liability for room rent for room
occupied by bankrupt, his wife and minor children, dischargeable); Wintrobe v. Con-
nors, 67 Ohio App. 106, 35 N.E.2d 1018 (1941).
133. In re Lo Grasso, 23 F. Supp. 340 (W.D.N.Y. 1938); Leman v. Locke, 240
Mass. 551, 134 N.E. 343 (1922); Schellenberg v. Mullaney, 112 App. Div. 384, 98
N.Y. Supp. 432 (1906).
134. In re Meyers, 12 F.2d 938 (W.D.N.Y. 1926).
135. Schellenberg v. Mullaney, 112 App. Div. 384, 98 N.Y. Supp. 432 (1926).
136. Blair v. Blair, 44 Cal. App. 2d 140, 112 P.2d 39 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941);
Holahan v. Holahan, 77 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Rape v. Lenz, 151 Wash. 675
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due a wife under a contract entered into prior to a divorce whereby the
husband promised the wife certain payments for her support and main-
tenance, are not released by a bankruptcy discharge, where the post-divorce
residue can properly be considered as payments due for maintenance of
the wife. 37
6. Seduction, Breach of Promise and Criminal Conversation
The Bankruptcy Act expressly provides that liability for seduction of an
unmarried female, breach of promise of marriage accompanied by seduc-
tion and criminal conversation are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The
bankruptcy discharge was designed to relieve the honest debtor from his
financial burdens, and to give him an opportunity to reinstate himself in the
business world. While men of business have their failings, nevertheless
the philanderer, the rou6 and rake, who have been caught with the
evidence, have no place in company with the unfortunate business man.
And so today the Bankruptcy Act forbids a discharge as to judgments which
have been obtained "for seduction of an unmarried female, or for a breach
of promise of marriage accompained by seduction or for criminal conversa-
tion."I' Even before the amendments in 1903 and 1917, making such liabili-
ties non-dischargeable, it was held that a judgment for crim. con.1 9 was not
barred by the judgment debtor's discharge in bankruptcy; the reasoning
was that criminal conversation with another man's wife constituted "wilful
and malicious injury to the property of another,"1 40 which, as we have
seen, is another category of non-dischargeable obligations. 141 Where the
claim against the bankrupt is for breach of promise only, unaccompanied
by seduction, the liability is dischargeable. 142 The act, of course, makes a
liability for breach of promise nondischargeable only when accompanied
by seduction.
It seems that such liabilities must first be reduced to judgment in order
276 Pac. 868 (1929).
137. In re Adams, 25 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1928). Cf. In re Avery, 114 F.2d 768
(6th Cir. 1940) (where the obligation was a judgment representing the amount of
arrears due under a divorce decree which had confirmed a property settlement be-
tween the parties, and the settlement showed that the amounts due were for alimony
and support of the wife, not dischargeable).
138. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 35 (1958).
139. "Crim. Con. An abbreviation for criminal conversation .. .. This term is used
to denote the act of adultery in a suit brought by the husband of the married woman
with whom the act was committed, to recover damages of the adulterer." Bouvina,
LAW DICTIONARY (Baldwin student ed. 1946).
140. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904).
141. See notes 86-119 supra and accompanying text.
142. In re Komar, 234 Fed. 378 (N.D.N.Y. 1916); Irish v. Owen, 98 N.J.L. 483,




to be provable; else they would be nonprovable torts. 143
7. Debts That Have Not Been Scheduled by the Bankrupt
If a creditor has never had an opportunity to share in the bankrupts
estate, his claim should not be discharged. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the Bankruptcy Act takes just that position. Section 17a(3) of the
act provides that a discharge shall not release a bankrupt from debts which
have not been duly scheduled, unless such creditor had timely notice or
actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy. 144 The bankrupts
schedule, of course, furnishes the basis for the notice which the referee or
the judge is to give to the creditors. The importance of a reasonably strict
compliance with the scheduling requirements is obvious. The act wisely
provides, therefore, that where the debt has not been duly scheduled it
will not be discharged, unless the creditor had timely notice or actual
knowledge of the proceedings. A bankrupt is required to list all of his
creditors in his schedules. 145 Such creditors will then receive notice of the
bankruptcy proceedings and will be apprised of the necessity of filing proofs
of claim. By omitting a creditor from his schedules, the bankrupt penalizes
only himself, for the effect of the failure to schedule a debt is to make an
otherwise dischargeable liability nondischargeable. Even after the dis-
charge, the nonscheduled creditor can pursue his remedies against the
bankrupt, unaffected by the discharge.146
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 a debt could be discharged, even
though a creditor was omitted from the schedules and had no notice or
knowledge of the proceedings, provided the omission was neither wilful
nor fraudulent.147 That has been changed now, and it is immaterial whether
the faulty scheduling was innocent, fraudulent, or careless; the fact of
143. For a discussion of this facet of tort claims, see notes 23-28 supra and accom-
panying text.
144. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(3), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 35 (1958).
145. It is provided in the Bankruptcy Act that the bankrupt shall "(8) prepare,
make oath to, and fie in court within five days after adjudication, if a voluntary bank-
rupt, a schedule of his property, showing the amount and kind of property, the loca-
tion thereof and its money value, in detail; and a list of all his creditors, including
persons asserting contingent, unliquidated, or disputed claims showing their resi-
dences or places of business, if known, or if unknown that fact to be stated, the
amount due to or claimed by each of them . . . . Provided, however, That the Court
may for cause shown grant further time for the filing of such schedules if, with his
petition in a voluntary proceeding or with his application to have such time extended
in an involuntary proceeding, the bankrupt files a list of all such creditors and their
addresses." Bankruptcy Act § 7a(8), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 548 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 25 (1958).
146. Milando v. Perrone, 157 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1946) (bankrupt not permitted to
reopen a long-closed estate to amend his schedules to include claim so that it would
be barred); Tyler v. Jones County Bank, 78 Ga. App. 741, 52 S.E.2d 547 (1947).
147. 1 Coruain, BAN RUPTcY ff 17.23 (14th ed. 1956).
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nonscheduling and not the intent controls.148 Section 17a(3) of the act
now expressly provides that a debt is not released by a discharge unless
it has been "duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name
of the creditor, if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice
or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy."14
9
It will be seen that in order for the debt to be "duly scheduled," the
name of the creditor, if known to the bankrupt, must be included in the
schedule of the bankrupt. What is and what is not sufficient performance
of this requirement must depend largely upon the facts of each case.150
Thus, while exactness is essential in scheduling the creditor's name, in
some instances a misnomer may not be fatal because of the principle of
idem sonans, or if for some other reason the misnomer could not be
misleading.' 51 However, a misnomer may be fatal to proper scheduling,
and a discharge denied, if the name is not of idem sonans.15 2 Thus, a mis-
take in the name of the creditor, although a relatively slight defect, if it
would be likely to cause confusion and result in his not receiving notices
or recognizing their purport, can amount to a lack of "due scheduling" so as
to make the claim nondischargeable for this reason.153 The use of the wrong
name in scheduling a claim is immaterial, of course, if the creditor in ques-
tion had timely notice of the bankruptcy proceedings, 154 as we will see
presently.155
It will readily be seen from reading section 17a(3) of the Bankruptcy
Act that the bankrupt is not required to insert the correct name of the
creditor in the schedule, if the name is unknown to the bankrupt.15 Con-
sequently, in order for the bankrupt to obtain a discharge, it is not impera-
tive that he schedules the creditor's name, if the bankrupt does not know
148. Ibid.;8 REMGTON, BANxR-PTCY § 3347 (6th ed. 1955).
149. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(3), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 35 (1958).
150. See Kreitlein v. Ferger, 238 U.S. 21 (1915) (involving sufficiency of residence
address); 8 REI NcTON, BANmnurTcy § 3348 (6th ed. 1955).
151. 1 COLLm, BANKRUPTCY ff 17.23 (14th ed. 1956); 8 REMINGTON, BANIRuWPrcy
99 3348, 3350 (6th ed. 1955).
152. Louis Cohen instead of Max Cohen is not "due scheduling." Cohen v. Pinkus,
126 App. Div. 792, 111 N.Y. Supp. 82 (1908). Likewise, William J. Davidson's debt was
not discharged when he was scheduled as William F. Davidson. Collins v. Davidson,
34 Ohio C.C.R. 668 (Cir. Ct. 1908). L. E. Ingram is not "due scheduling" for W. G.
Ingram. Ingram v. Carruthers, 194 Tenn. 290, 250 S.W.2d 537 (1952).
153. 8 REmINGToN, BANxRupcy § 3350 (6th ed. 1955).
154. Cohen v. Pinkus, 126 App. Div. 792, 11 N.Y. Supp. 82 (1908).
155. See notes 169-85 infra and accompanying text, for treatment of the effect of
creditor's knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings, even though his claim was not
scheduled.




the name of the creditor. 5 7 This rule has its principal application where,
unknown to the bankrupt, the debt is transferred to another party'5 8 In
the event the bankrupt does not know the name of the present owner of
the claim, it is enough if the bankrupt schedules the claim in the name of
the original creditor.159 Of course, if the bankrupt, knowing that the
claim has been transferred by the original creditor and either knowing
or should be knowing the identity of the present owner of the claim,
nevertheless schedules the claim in the name of the original creditor,
the claim is not properly scheduled and is not discharged.16°
Great care and caution must also be taken by the bankrupt in giving
the residences of his creditors. Section 7a(8) of the Bankruptcy Act
requires the bankrupt to include in his schedules not only the names of
his creditors, but also "their residences or places of business, if known, or
if unknown that fact to be stated ... .16 1 Thus, proper scheduling within
the purview of the Bankruptcy Act requires that the residences or places
of business of creditors, if known to the bankrupt, be set forth in the
schedule; and if the bankrupt is ignorant of such information, this fact
must be expressly stated in his schedule.162 If the bankrupt lists the resi-
dence of a creditor as "unknown," but knows the address or by the exercise
of reasonable diligence could have ascertained the residence, the debt has
not been properly scheduled and will not be discharged where the creditor
had no notice or actual knowledge of the proceeding.16 3 In short, he
157. "The Bankruptcy Act does not require the impossible, but provides for the
listing of the names of creditors 'if known to the bankrupt' and not otherwise. Failure
to state the names of unknown creditors does not impair the efficacy of the discharge."
Levin v. Katz, 293 Mich. 493, 292 N.W. 466, 468 (1940), quoting Broderick v. Adam-
son, 240 App. Div, 229, 268 N.Y. Supp. 766, 769 (1934). Many other cases take the
same position. E.g., Kreitlein v. Ferger, 238 U.S. 21 (1915); Cleveland v. Summerfield,
194 Ark. 727, 109 S.W.2d 438, 440 (1937).
158. New Netherland Bank v. Harris, 233 Ill. App. 378 (1924); Levin v. Katz,
293 Mich. 493, 292 N.W. 466 (1940).
159. 1 Co.IER, BAN RuPTCY ff 17.23 (14th ed. 1956).
160. Ismay v. Tyler, 169 Cal. App. 2d 883, 337 P.2d 257 (Super. Ct. 1959); State
ex tel. Nilsen v. Bean, 218 Ore. 506, 346 P.2d 652 (1959); see 1 COLLIER, BA-
nupTCY [ 17.23 (14th ed. 1956); 8 REmiNGTON, BA.mKrPTcY § 3354 (6th ed. 1955).
An assigned claim which is scheduled in the name of the assignor is barred, however,
where the assignor is the agent of the assignee and has actual notice of bankruptcy.
Katz v. Kowalsky, 296 Mich. 164, 295 N.W. 600 (1941).
161. Bankruptcy Act § 7a(8), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 548 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 25 (1958).
162. Ibid.
163. Miller v. Guasti, 226 U.S. 170 (1912); In re Dvorak, 107 Fed. 76 (N.D. Iowa
1901); Parker v. Murphy, 215 Mass. 72, 102 N.E. 85 (1913); Wyser v. Estrin, 285
App. Div. 827, 136 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1955). Where the wrong address is scheduled,
and there is nothing to indicate that the bankrupt exercised reasonable diligence in
ascertaining the correct address of the creditor, the claim may not be discharged because
it is not duly scheduled. King v. Harry, 131 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1955) (bankrupt
apparently knew correct address four months prior to filing of bankruptcy petition).
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is required to use reasonable diligence in ascertaining the correct address
of his creditors. 164
Where the bankrupt is unable to ascertain the residence or place of
business of a creditor, he not only should show that fact but should also
show what efforts he has put forth to ascertain that information.
165
Just what constitutes satisfactory designation of the residence or place
of business of the creditor must depend upon the particular facts and
circumstances of each case.166 The act itself does not spell out what must
be done with respect to giving the street number or other location of the
creditor. If the scheduled address of the residence or place of business of
the creditor is wrong, however, his claim will not be discharged, in the
absence of proof that the creditor had knowledge of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.167 Nor will the claim be duly scheduled where the bankrupt
lists an incorrect address for the creditor, if by using reasonable diligence,
he could have ascertained the correct address.
168
Although the bankrupt fails to comply with the requirements of sched-
uling the claim, name and address of the creditor, the claim may yet be
discharged. Section 17a(3) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the claim
of an unscheduled creditor is discharged if he had timely notice or actual
knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy.169 A crucial question is what
constitutes "notice or actual knowledge"? This does not mean that creditors
are charged with constructive notice of bankruptcies upon the theory that
bankruptcies are a matter of public record, because such a construction
would be stultifying. 70 Nor is publication of notice of bankruptcy pro-
ceeding in a newspaper sufficient notice to comply with the act, if the
creditor did not in fact see such notice.' 7 ' Nor will notice of the bankruptcy
proceedings given to one agency of the United States be imputed to another
agency which is the creditor of the bankrupt.
172
In short, it seems that, except in the case of imputation of notice of an
agent to his principal, such notice or knowledge must be actual; con-
164. Ibid. See 8 REmINGTON, BANKRuPTcY § 3352 (6th ed. 1955).
165. In re Dvorak, 107 Fed. 76 (N.D. Iowa 1901). See Union Trust Co. v. Rosen-
stein, 51 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1944).
166. See Kreitlein v. Ferger, 238 U.S. 21 (1915), for an extensive discussion of
this problem.
167. Van Denburgh v. Goodfellow, 19 Cal. 2d 217, 120 P.2d 20 (1941); McGehee v.
Brookins, 140 S.W.2d 963 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). Nor will the bankrupt be per-
mitted to amend his schedule to show the correct address of the creditor after the
time for filing of the creditor's claim has expired. In the Matter of Pierce, 150 F.
Supp. 529 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
168. Salmon v. Sarno, 265 App. Div. 114, 37 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1942).
169. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(3), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 35 (1958).
170. See MAcLA mAN, BANKsuprrcy § 105 (1956).
171. Tyler v. Jones County Bank, 78 Ga. App. 741, 52 S.E.2d 547 (1949); Indus-
trial Loan & Inv. Co. v. Chapman, 193 So. 504 (La. App. 1940).
172. United States v. Golenburg, 175 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
[ VOL. 15
DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS
structive notice or knowledge is not sufficient. 173 It is not necessary that
notice be served upon the creditor; it is enough that facts show that he
had knowledge of the proceedings. 174 Actual knowledge is sufficient how-
ever it is acquired; it is a fact question and may be proved by circum-
stantial evidence.17 5 Thus, knowledge of the bankruptcy received by the
creditor from reading the newspaper is sufficient.
176
With regard to the requirement of notice or knowledge on the part of
the creditor, the ordinary laws of agency apply. Hence, notice to, or
knowledge of, an agent of the creditor will be treated as knowledge of the
principal (creditor) where the agent is authorized to receive such notice for
his principal.177 Consistent with the general principles of agency, the
knowledge of the creditor's agent will not be imputed to the creditor where
the agent is acting adversely to his principal.17 8
In order for the notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings to
be effective, so as to render the claim dischargeable, the notice or knowl-
edge must be timely. Even though the creditor may have actual knowledge
of the proceedings, such knowledge may not be sufficient because of the
time when the creditor received the information. As contemplated by the
Bankruptcy Act, actual knowledge of the proceedings, in order to be
sufficient, must be received in time to allow the creditor to prove his claim
and to have an opportunity to participate along with other creditors in the
estate of the bankrupt.17 9 It has been suggested that the court may well
173. See 1 CoLLE, BA~imcuprcY fr 17.23 (14th ed. 1956).
174. See I COLLIm, BANxRupTcY 17.23 (14th ed. 1956).
175. See Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592 (1923); Ingram v. Carruthers, 194 Tenn. 290,
250 S.W.2d 537 (1952).
176. See Morrison v. Vaughan, 119 App. Div. 184, 104 N.Y. Supp. 169 (1907) (read-
ing newspaper and verbal knowledge); Bank of Wrightsville v. Four Seasons, 21 Ga.
App. 453, 94 S.E. 649 (1917).
177. See 8 REMIMGTON, BANKRupTcY § 3357 (6th ed. 1955). Thus, the bankrupts
own attorney, who represented him during the proceedings, could hardly claim ig-
norance of the proceedings. Pate v. Morrow, 91 Ga. App. 864, 87 S.E.2d 357 (1955).
Where the creditor in question had placed his claim in the hands of an attorney to be
collected, and the attorney informed the creditor that the debtor intended to fie a
petition in bankruptcy, and the attorney did receive actual knowledge through notices
sent to creditors that the petition had been filed, the creditor had sufficient knowledge to
render the debt dischargeable, although his claim was not scheduled. Rosenfeld v. Moore,
112 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Broome County Ct. 1952). However, notice sent to an attorney after
he had ceased to represent the creditor in question is not sufficient to make the claim
dischargeable. Wilkotz v. Ziss, 13 N.J.L. 3, 57 A.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1948). A notice
sent to an attorney who represented the creditor at the time judgment was entered
but did not represent the creditor at the time of the bankruptcy proceedings was not
sufficient notice or knowledge to make the claim dischargeable. Continental Purchas-
ing Co. v. Noreli, 133 N.J.L. 550, 45 A.2d 310 (1946), a]'d, 135 N.J.L. 93, 48 A.2d
816 (Ct. App. 1946).
178. See Dight v. Chapman, 44 Ore. 265, 75 Pac. 585, 590 (1904).
179. In order to be dischargeable, the act provides that the scheduling must have
been "in time for proof and allowance." Bankruptcy Act § 17a(3), ch. 541, 30 Stat.
550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1958). Section 57 of the Bankruptcy Act
1961 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
inquire into the circumstances of the particular case to see whether a
creditor lost any substantial practical rights or privileges by a late sched-
uling or a late notice of the facts, assuming always that scheduling and
notice, if there was notice, occurred so as to come within the language of
the Bankruptcy Act "in time for proof and allowance."180
Questions arise regarding who has the burden of proving due scheduling
so as to make the claim dischargeable. To start with, the plea of a discharge
in bankruptcy is an affirmative defense, which the bankrupt has the burden
of establishing.181 However, when the bankrupt has introduced a certified
copy of the order of discharge, he has established prima facie proof of the
discharge of his debts.182 The burden of proof of lack of due scheduling
then apparently rests on the creditor.183 That is to say, the creditor must
show that his claim was not duly scheduled in time for proof and allow-
ance.184 But once the creditor has discharged that burden (as by showing
that his residence was not included in the bankrupts schedule), then the
burden apparently is on the bankrupt either to show that he used reasonable
diligence in attempting to ascertain the creditor's residence, or that the
creditor had actual knowledge or notice of the bankruptcy proceeding in
time to participate therein.18
Although a particular debt is not barred by a discharge because of a
failure to schedule the claim, this will not prevent the bankrupt from
properly scheduling the debt and obtaining an effective discharge there-
from in a subsequent bankruptcy. 186 There is one limitation: a subsequent
bankruptcy discharge cannot be obtained within six years, since that is one
of the specified grounds for refusing to grant a discharge.187
fixes the time when a claim must be filed. There are exceptions contained in section 57
which allow a longer time, but the normal time for filing is six months from the first
date set for the first meeting of creditors. Bankruptcy Act § 57, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 560
(1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 93 (1958). The problem of what is timely scheduling
is dealt with in Birkett v. Columbia Bank, 195 U.S. 345 (1904); Davis v. Findley, 201
Ala. 515, 78 So. 869 (1918); Milando v. Perrone, 157 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1946)
(bankrupt not permitted to open proceedings and schedule claim after time had
elapsed); Industrial Loan & Inv. Co. v. Chapman, 193 So. 504 (La. App. 1940).
180. MAcLAcHLAN, BAN KuPcy § 116, at 106 (1956).
181. See 1 COLLmR, BANmKupTcY f[ 17.23, at 1637 (14th ed. 1956).
182. See Kreitlein v. Ferger, 238 U.S. 21 (1915); Eldrington v. Gee, 30 S.W.2d 360
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Schwartzman, 150 N.Y.S.2d 827
(Sup. Ct. 1956); 8 REMiNGTON, BairmuTcy § 3359 (6th ed. 1955).
183. See Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592 (1923); Kreitlein v. Ferger, 238 U.S. 21 (1915).
184. Ibid.
185. Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592 (1923); Caldwell v. Eastman, 248 Mass. 332, 142
N.E. 765 (1924).
186. In re Lyons, 287 Fed. 602 (E.D.N.Y. 1922); In re Baker, 275 Fed. 511
(S.D.N.Y. 1920).
187. Section 14c of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the court shall grant the
discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has "(5) in a proceeding under this Act
commenced within six years prior to the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy




Section 17a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that a discharge does not
release the bankrupt from debts created by the fraud, embezzlement,
misappropriation or defalcation of the bankrupt "while acting as an officer
in any fiduciary capacity."188 In order for a particular liability to be
excepted from the effect of the discharge, it must arise from either (a)
fraud, (b) embezzlement (c) misappropriation, or (d) defalcation; and
in all cases the liability must have been created by such misconduct while
the bankrupt was acting as an officer or in a fiduciary capacity. 89
At the outset, questions will arise as to the meaning of the qualifying
phrase "while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity." First, what
is the meaning of "officer"? The Bankruptcy Acts of 1841 and 1867 ex-
empted from the operation of the discharge those specified wrongs of the
bankrupt committed while acting as a public officer.190 The Act of 1898
omitted the qualifying word "public,"191 and we are told that this exception
to the discharge has not been amended since.192 The term "officer," as now
used in this exception from the operation of the discharge, includes officers
of a private corporation,193 as well as a public officer.194 A director of a
corporation is an officer within the statutory intendment of this exceptiori
from the discharge. 95 Likewise within this exception from the operati6oi
of a discharge is a president of a corporation, 96 and a vice-president. 197
As we have seen, the four types of misconduct that are made nondis-
chargeable by section 17a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act can be committed
either while acting as an "officer" or while acting "in any fiduciary capacity."
composition or a wage earner's plan by way of composition confirmed under this Act."
Bankruptcy Act § 14c, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 32
(1958).
188. Bankruptcy Act § 17a, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 35 (1958).
189. See Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176 (1904), where the Supreme Court held
that the phrase, "while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity," qualifies all
of the four enumerated wrongs, and not just "defalcation," which immediately precedes
the phrase.
190. See 1 CoLLmR, BANmRuPTcY ff 17.24, at 1646 (14th ed. 1956).
191. Ibid.
192. 8 REMINGTON, BANxuPTCy § 3362 (6th ed. 1955).
193. In re Bernard, 87 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1937); Bloemecke v. Applegate, 271 Fed.
595 (3d Cir. 1921) (president); Kaufman v. Lederfine, 49 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y.
1943) (officer and director); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Hargreaves, 36 Cal. App. 2d 338;"98
P.2d 217 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (bank president); In re Weirs Estate, 249 Wis. 385,
24 N.W.2d 662 (1946).
194. See Bloemecke v. Applegate, 271 Fed. 595, 598 (3d Cir. 1921).
195. In re Hammond, 98 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 646
(1938); Boyd v. Applewhite, 121 Miss. 879, 84 So. 16 (1920).
196. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Hargreaves, 36 Cal. App. 2d 338, 98 P.2d 217 (Dist. Ct
App. 1939) (bank president).
197. In re Harper, 133 Fed. 970 (W.D. Va. 1904), aff'd, 141 Fed. 626 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 200 U.S. 621 (1905).
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We have gotten some idea of the meaning of "officer." It now remains for
us to explore the meaning of "fiduciary." The word "fiduciary," as here
used, does not cover all agencies. This exclusion from the operation of
the discharge, perhaps unfortunately, has been confined by and large to a
technical trust relationship, or fiduciary relationships created by statute,
thus excluding a vast area where duties of accounting are imposed because
of one's conduct with respect to another's property. It is not enough that
by the act of wrong-doing out of which a contested claim arises the bank-
rupt has become chargeable as a constructive trustee; he must have been
a fiduciary before the wrong and without reference thereto.198 Thus, this
exception from the effect of the discharge has been construed to have no
application to constructive trusts.199 Nor does this exception from the
discharge apply to misconduct of factors,200 brokers,201 agents 0 2 bailees,2 03
and partners. 2 4 Moreover, acts in violation of a "trust receipt" are not
done while acting in a "fiduciary capacity" and are not made nondischarge-
able by this section of the act.2 5 Of course, the ordinary debtor-creditor
relationship is not within the meaning of this statutory exemption from
the discharge; otherwise a discharge would have but little meaning. Con-
sequently, the frauds of the ordinary debtor in disposing of his property
to defraud his creditors do not come within the purview of this exclusion
from the effect of the discharge.
20 6
Executors and administrators,20 7 guardians208 and receivers,2 09 as well as
198. See Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934).
199. See Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934); Addison v. Addison,
96 Ohio App. 191, 118 N.E.2d 225 (1953); 8 EEINGTON, BANKuxTrrcY § 3364 (6th
ed. 1955).
200. Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176 (1904) (commission merchant and factor
who sold goods for others and remitted proceeds); In re Adler, 152 Fed. 422 (2d Cir.
1957) (factor to sell goods for others and remit proceeds).
201. In re Ennis & Stoppani, 171 Fed. 755 (D.N.Y. 1909).
202. Noble v. Hammond, 129 U.S. 65 (1889); In re Wenham, 153 Fed. 910
(S.D.N.Y. 1906); American Sur. Co. v. Koff, 268 App. Div. 1055, 52 N.Y.S.2d 463
(1945).
203. In re Toklas Bros., 201 Fed. 377 (E.D.N.Y. 1912).
204. Stephens v. Miliken, 35 Ga. App. 287, 133 S.E. 67 (1926); Gee v. Gee, 84
Minn. 384,87 N.W. 1116 (1901).
205. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934).
206. Reeves v. McCracken, 69 N.J. Eq. 203, 60 Atl. 332 (Ch. 1905).
207. Brown v. Hannagan, 210 Mass. 246, 96 N.E. 714 (1911); Arnold v. Smith.
137 Minn. 364, 163 N.W. 672 (1917).
208. indemnity Ins. Co. v. Leibrock, 55 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1945).
209. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1937)
(bankrupt appointed receiver by state court in foreclosure suit was allowed money
as commission by lower court; he spent money pending appeal; case reversed on
appeal; liability for spent commission not discharged). In the Herbst case Justice
Learned Hand traces the legislative background and meaning of § 17a(4) of the




trustees of express trusts,210 are "fiduciaries" within the statutory intend-
ment. Agents and representatives other than trustees of express trusts,
executors, administrators and guardians have sometimes been held to be
"fiduciaries" within the meaning of this statutory exclusion from the effect
of the discharge. Thus, an employee who has been entrusted with funds
and embezzles or misappropriates them has been held guilty of misconduct
that gives rise to a nondischargeable liability.211 Of course, attorneys at
law occupy a fiduciary relationship to their clients, and if guilty of any of
the four specified types of misconduct while so acting, they will be impaled
on this exclusion from the operation of the bankruptcy discharge.2 12
It would be most unfortunate if a dishonest person, simply because he
had not been an officer of some sort or a fiduciary, could use bankruptcy as
a means of escaping liability for defaults that morally were of the same
texture as the worst acts an officer or a fiduciary can commit. This has been
prevented, by and large, by holdings that the term "wilful and malicious
injury to person and property" (which makes a liability nondischargeable)
covers the area which is occupied by such persons as agents, bailees,
brokers, factors and partners, who prove unfaithful by converting property
of others.213
In order for the liabilities of the bankrupt to be nondischargeable under
section 17a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act, they must have been created, as we
have seen, either by the (a) fraud, (b) embezzlement, (c) misappropria-
tion, or (d) defalcation of the bankrupt while acting as an officer or in any
fiduciary capacity. Having examined the meaning of the legislatively
specified words "officer" and "fiduciary," it remains for us to explore briefly,
at least, the meaning of the four types of misconduct that will give rise to
the nondischargeable obligation.
"Fraud" means actual, positive fraud, or fraud in fact, involving moral
turpitude or intentional wrong; and not implied fraud, or fraud in law,
which may exist without the imputation of bad faith or immorality.2 14 The
Supreme Court has said that such an interpretation of the word "fraud" is
consonant with equity and consistent with the object and intention of
Congress in enacting a general law by which the honest citizen may be
relieved from the burden of hopeless insolvency.
215
210. Bracken v. Milner, 104 Fed. 522 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1900) (trustee under deed
of trust); Fine v. Saul, 183 Ga. 309, 188 S.E. 439 (1936).
211. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Fant, 181 Tenn. 492, 181 S.W.2d 753 (1944). In Hamby
v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1954), the misappropriation
by a real estate agent of funds entrusted to him for the purpose of paying off liens on
claimant's property were held to create a liability that was nondischargeable.
212. See In re Kane, 48 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1931).
213. See notes 86-97 supra and accompanying text, where this exception from the
discharge is discussed.




"Embezzlement" as used in section 17a(4) has been construed to mean
the fraudulent misappropriation by the bankrupt officer or fiduciary of
funds entrusted to his custody. It differs from larceny in the fact that in
embezzlement, the original taking of the property was lawful, or with the
consent of the owner, while in larceny the felonious intent must have
existed at the time of the taking.2 16
"Misappropriation" of funds within the purview of section 17a(4) of the
Bankruptcy Act seems similar to embezzlement and involves the wrongful
use of funds.217 It is said by the courts that misappropriation must be
due to a known breach of duty, and not to mere negligence or mistake.218
However, even though the fiduciary has no actual knowledge of his legal
duties, he is chargeable as a matter of law with knowledge of his duties
as imposed on him by law, so as to make his misuse of funds an intentional
breach, resulting in a nondischargeable liability based on misappropria-
tion.219
"Defalcation" would include a shortage by a fiduciary of his accounts; it
is a broader term than embezzlement, and probably broader than misap-
propriation220 "Defalcation," it is said, covers innocent as well as inten-
tional defaults where there is a surcharging of accounts for legally improper
expenditures or appropriations of funds. 1 Where a fiduciary (receiver
appointed by court) spent the court awarded commission while the case
was on appeal, and the award was reversed, he was guilty of "defalcation"
so that his liability was nondischargeable.222
9. Wages
Section 17a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the bankruptcy
discharge shall not release the bankrupt from claims for wages earned
216. See Moore v. United States, 160 U.S. 268 (1895).
217. In re Hammond, 98 F.2d 703 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 646 (1938)
(director took over corporation's contract for his own profit); In re Bernard, 87 F.2d
705 (2d Cir. 1937) (director and president, knowing a corporation to be insolvent,
appropriated part of its assets to liquidate his own claims and those of his son who
was another officer; held to be a misappropriation since bankrupt knew corporation
was insolvent and that the interests of other creditors would be sacrificed for the benefit
of bankrupt and son); In re Adelson, 187 Misc. 691, 65 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. Ct. 1946)
(corporate officer caused corporation to prefer debts on which he was surety).
218. In re Bernard, 87 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1937). See note 217 supra.
219. In re Hammond, 98 F.2d 703 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 646 (1938). For
going behind a judgment on a note given to cover misappropriations in a fiduciary
capacity, so as to render liability nondischargeable, see Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Golom-
bosky, 133 Conn. 317, 50 A.2d 817 (1946).
220. See Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1937);
Kaufman v. Lederfine, 49 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). To the effect that defalca-
tion is broader than embezzlement or misappropriation, see In re Butts, 120 Fed. 96
(D.N.Y. 1903).
221. See 8 REMINGTON, B.ANMUPTcY § 3363 (6th ed. 1955).
222. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1937)
(the court did not consider bankrupt completely innocent in this case, however).
[ VOL. 15
DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS
within three months prior to bankruptcy, due to workmen, servants, clerks,
traveling or city salesmen, on salary or commission basis, whole or part
time, whether or not selling exclusively for the bankrupt.2 3 Moreover, it
should also be remembered that such claims are granted priority of pay-
ment under the Bankruptcy Act up to $60O. 4 Under section 17a(5) there
is no limitation as to the amount of wages exempt from the discharge.
Consequently, the entire unpaid amount of wages will be excluded from
the effect of the discharge, provided the wages were earned within the
three-month period.
Presumably wage earners are given these two preferred positions in
bankruptcy on the ground that they are not as well situated as other
creditors to bear a pro rata share of the losses in the event of bankrupt
employers.225
10. Money Received or Retained for Faithful Performance
The last category of claims which are not released by a discharge is
found in section 17a(6) of the Bankruptcy Act.2 6 This section of the act
expressly excepts from the discharge debts due for moneys of an employee
received or retained by his employer to secure the faithful performance by
such employee of the terms of his contract of employment. The employer
may well retain such a fund from the employee who is entrusted with the
funds of the employer.
IV. ThE PEmSONAL NATuRE oF TH DISCHARGE
While a discharge in bankruptcy constitutes a complete defense to a
creditor's claim on a dischargeable debt scheduled in the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, nevertheless the discharge does not ipso facto relieve the bankrupt
from all future liability for debts covered in the discharge. Since no court,
other than the bankruptcy court, is bound to take judical notice of the
discharge, it must be properly pleaded and proved in a suit against the
bankrupt in order to bar a judgment against him; if not so pleaded, it is
waived as a defense. 227 In short, the bankrupt loses the benefit of the
223. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(5), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 35 (1958).
224. Bankruptcy Act § 64a(2), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 104 (1958).
225. See MAcLACHLAw, BANmupTrcy § 106 (1956).
226. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(6), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 35 (1958). See In re Thomashefsky, 51 F.2d 1040 (2d Cir. 1931) (such claim not
dischargeable).
227. Dimock v. Revere Copper Co., 117 U.S. 559 (1886); In re Innis, 140 F.2d 479
(7th Cir. 1944); Elliott v. Warwick Stores, Inc., 329 Mass. 406, 108 N.E.2d 681
(1952); Murray v. Bass, 184 N.C. 318, 114 S.E. 303 (1922). See Personal Industrial
Loan Corp. v. Forgay, 240 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1956); Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d 263,
266 (4th Cir. 1942); 8 RmINGToN, BANKRUPTCY § 3240 (6th ed. 1955). However,
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defense of a discharge if he does not interpose it when sued. Because of
the personal character of the discharge, it releases the bankrupt's personal
liability only; consequently, a valid lien on the bankrupt's property is not
released by the discharge.228
Moreover, since the bankrupt's obligation itself survives bankruptcy-
only the remedy of the creditor being affected-the bar of the discharge
can be removed by the bankrupt.22 It is now generally agreed that the
defense of the discharge may be waived by the bankrupts making a new
promise. Here, again, the filing of the petition is the dividing line, since
the discharge, as we have seen,230 relates to debts in existence at the date
of the petition. So a promise by the bankrupt to pay a provable debt, not-
withstanding his discharge, is as effectual to lift the bar when made after
the filing of the petition and before the discharge as if made after the
discharge.231 Hence, it is immaterial whether the promise is made before
or after the discharge, just so it is made after the date the petition is filed.
232
Of course, a promise to waive a discharge made before the petition is not
valid and enforceable after the discharge23 3 The policy of the Bankruptcy
Act in relation to discharges would clearly be defeated if a creditor could
circumvent the discharge by the simple expedient of exacting such a
waiver as a price of giving credit.2
34
in Gore v. Goreman's, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Mo. 1956), the bankrupt success-
fully maintained against his creditor a suit for malicious prosecution when the creditor,
with knowledge that his claim had been discharged, twice brought suit against the
bankrupt in an attempt to enforce the collection of the debt which had been discharged
in bankruptcy. The creditor, by way of defense to the malicious prosecution suit, as-
serted that the discharge in bankruptcy was not an extinguishment of his debt, but
only gave the bankrupt the right to plead the discharge affirmatively as a defense, and
unless pleaded, it was waived. The court rejected the contention of the creditor,
holding that the bankruptcy discharge did release the debt. In his malicious prosecu-
tion suit, the bankrupt recovered punitive damages, as well as compensatory damages,
the court finding that the creditor had instituted his suits with malice and without
probable cause. The court felt that the suits were only for the purpose of harassing
the bankrupt into paying the discharged liability.
228. Robinson v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 28 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Okla. 1939);
Prebyl v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
641 (1938). We know, of course, that under certain circumstances valid liens obtained
by judicial proceedings within four months of bankruptcy can be avoided by the
trustee. Bankruptcy Act § 67a, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1958).
229. See 1 COLLER, BANIMUPTCY ff 17.23 (14th ed. 1956) and SUPPLEMENT.
230. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.
231. See Zavello v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913).
232. Ibid.
233. Federal Nat'l Bank v. Koppel, 253 Mass. 157, 148 N.E. 379 (1925) (promissory
note delivered by the bankrupt before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy contained
a clause "waiving all benefits of whatever kind or nature that any laws give or intend to
give for the advantage or protection of the maker hereof." Maker's discharge in
bankruptcy was held a good defense in an action on the note).
234. See Federal Nat'l Bank v. Koppel, 253 Mass. 157, 148 N.E. 379, 380 (1925);
1vAcLAchLAN, BA.KRUPTCY § I1 (1956).
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The Bankruptcy Act does not provide for the manner in which debts
can be revived after bankruptcy; such matters are left to the laws of the
various states. Consequently, it is settled generally that the defense of the
discharge is waived by a new promise to pay the debt, even if no new
consideration is given by the creditor for the debtor's promise to pay the
debt that was covered by the discharge.2 35
No doubt it would be within the power of Congress to enact provisions
in the Bankruptcy Act governing the matter, but there is no such provision
and each state is at liberty to apply its own rules as to the type of promise
that will be enforceable. Some states, by statute, require that a new
promise to pay a debt barred by bankruptcy must be in writing in order
to be effectual,=3 but at common law such a promise may be oral 3 7
Although a bankrupts discharge is regarded as a personal defense to the
creditor's remedy, the discharge can be set up as a defense to a debt
by the bankrupts privies.=
Section 17a of the Bankruptcy Act specifies the classes of liabilities from
which the bankrupt cannot obtain relief through a discharge in bankruptcy.
These we have discussed in some detail. Some years ago the late Garrard
Glenn, a truly great scholar in the field of creditors' rights, wrote, with
respect to liabilities that are not released by the discharge, that there are
"certain obligations which no right minded person would allow a certificate
(of discharge) to release."239 The reader will form his own opinion whether
the judicial construction of those statutory exemptions from the discharge
has been in line with Mr. Glenn's appraisal of the nondischargeability of
debts.
235. See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 158 (3d ed. 1057).
236. 1 WiLLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 158 (3d ed. 1957).
237. Ibid.
238. Fleitas v. Richardson, 147 U.S. 550 (1892) (mortgages of bankrupt could set
up discharge); Upshur v. Briscoe, 138 U.S. 365 (1891) (widow, the fraudulent grantee
of bankrupt, entitled to benefit of discharge).
239. GLmN, LIQUIDATION § 358 (1935).
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